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A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers
to Employment of Ex-convicts
By LEROY D. CLARK*
OUR NATION FACES a growing problem that cries out for careful,
rational reforms. As of June 2002, the prison and jail population ex-
ceeded two million inmates for the first time.' State prisons operated
between 1% and 16% above capacity and federal prisons operated
31% above capacity. 2 The inmate population grew an average of 3.8%
each year from 1995 to 2002.3
This inmate population naturally turns over-in 2001 over
600,000 prisoners were released on probation or parole, or because
they completed their sentences. 4 Those released persons face the
daunting task of integrating themselves back into the very different
mainstream society and most importantly into the work world. The
task of integrating the" ex-offender into employment is a valuable task
for society to undertake because unemployment is strongly correlated
with recidivism. Unfortunately, there are many laws and ordinances
that prohibit ex-offenders from certain categories of employment,
thus impeding that facet of the rehabilitation process.
This article explores the range and scope of the legal impedi-
ments to ex-offenders' employment, but it also has other goals. A
question is raised as to what has prompted the imposition of the civil
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. I wish to acknowledge the
excellent research provided by Ms. Yvette Brown of the Law Library at Catholic University
Law School.
1. The precise figures were 1,344,748 in state and federal prisons and 665,475 in
local jails for a total of 2,019,234. A jail is a local correctional facility that holds persons
prior to trial or for service ofjail time for misdemeanor convictions with a sentence of one
year or less. PAIGE M. HARRISON &JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2002 1 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. See id. at 6. The precise figure was 630,207.
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disabilities imposed on ex-offenders regarding employment, and why
they are so widespread and unchanging despite a wealth of scholarly
objection to their maintenance. A very important question, not raised
by other scholars on the topic, will be raised here-namely, should
traditional civil rights organizations, concerned with improving the
conditions for black Americans, begin to treat this problem as one
that is in urgent need of law reform? If so, what resistances will such
organizations meet, and what strategies are appropriate responses?
I. The Nature of Impediments to Employment of
Ex-offenders
A. Licensing Laws
Under licensing laws, an individual is granted a privilege by the
state (and not a "right") to engage in particular occupations. 5 Licens-
ing laws come in two forms: revenue raising and regulatory. Generally,
revenue raising license laws are merely tax measures. The applicant
secures the license by paying a fee, and the state does not inquire into
the applicant's background or competence to perform particular
tasks.
Regulatory license laws, however, are an exercise of the state's
police powers designed to protect the public's health, safety, and wel-
fare.6 The courts generally sustain the right of the state to bar access
to the licensed occupations, and only under rare circumstances do the
courts find that coverage of a particular job is unreasonable. 7 Addi-
tionally, functioning without a license may itself be a crime.8 The
United States Supreme Court held that it is not a violation of due
5. See, e.g., In re Morris, 397 P.2d 475, 476 (N.M. 1964) (explaining that a license
grants no vested right, but is a conditional privilege, which is revocable for cause).
6. See Ellestad v. Swayze, 130 P.2d 349, 353 (Wash. 1942) (holding that the state may
exercise its licensing powers to protect the public welfare).
7. See, e.g., State v. Balance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. 1949) (holding that licensing of
photographers was unreasonable in that it had no relation to public health, morals, or
safety); Dasch v. Jackson, 183 A. 534, 542 (Md. 1936) (holding that regulation of paper
hangers was unreasonable). One scholar, however, argues that most trade groups can con-
vince the courts that there is some "public interest" in controlling access to the occupation,
despite the fact that such groups may be more interested in protecting their income by
restraining the number of competitors. See Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Li-
censing, 44 U. CI. L. RFv. 6, 10-13 (1976).
8. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23301 (West 2003) (establishing misdemeanor
and felony charges for selling alcoholic beverages without a license).
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process for a state to establish disqualifications based on criminal con-
viction in order to exclude persons from certain employment.9
The major way in which the state denies ex-convicts employment
is under the regulatory provisions that govern the issuance of a license
to practice a profession or engage in a particular occupation. The laws
of every state,10 some federal statutes, 1 and innumerable municipal
ordinances 12 expressly include a felony conviction as a disqualifying
factor with regard to the majority of regulated occupations. A study
done in the 1970s showed that there were 1,948 separate statutes that
utilized an arrest or conviction as a disqualifying factor when applying
for a license. 13 Occasionally, the disqualification will attach even to a
misdemeanor conviction.14 Under some statutes a conviction is only
one negative factor that employers should evaluate in addition to miti-
gating factors, like the length of time since conviction, or evidence of
subsequent conduct that may show rehabilitation. Under other stat-
utes a conviction is an absolute and permanent bar of access to that
occupation. 15
The state may also deny an ex-convict a license under statutes
that do not expressly make for disqualification through a conviction.
Regulatory licensing provisions are aimed at screening for two quali-
ties: "competence" or "character." An ex-felon may qualify under the
"competence" standard by receiving appropriate training and educa-
tion. However, a number of the licensing provisions require an assess-
ment of whether the applicant is a person "of good moral
9. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898) (holding that a felony convic-
tion "is evidence of the unfitness" of ex-convicts to qualify for a professional license (quot-
ing Foster v. Police Comm'r, 37 P. 763, 765 (Cal. 1894)); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144
(1960) (holding that the exclusion of felons from labor union office was constitutional).
10. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF
CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996).
11. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 12a(2)(D), (3)(D) (2000) (permitting the refusal to register com-
mission merchants and floor brokers for any felony conviction).
12. See, e.g., Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 154 A.2d 9, 17 (N.J. 1959) (sustaining
municipal regulation of door-to-door salesmen for future delivery of services or goods).
13. JAMES W. HUNT ET AL., NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RE-
STRICTIONS LAws, LICENSES AND THE OFFENDER'S RIGHT TO WORK 5 (1973) (giving a compre-
hensive review of occupational licensing laws in the states).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (B) (i) (2000) (barring a broker-dealer from registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission upon conviction of a misdemeanor).
15. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-2-6.2 (Michie 1999). The provision governs obtaining
a liquor license: "Any licensee under this title, with the exception of a solicitor, must be a
person of good moral character, never convicted of a felony, and if a corporation, the
managing officers thereof must have like qualifications." Id.
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character." 16 Naturally, a number of licensing agencies utilize a felony
conviction as conclusive proof of a lack of "good moral character."
The terms are often not defined in the statute, thus giving the licens-
ing agency broad and almost untrammeled discretion. While the
United States Supreme Court, in dictum, noted the inherent ambigu-
ity in the terms, 17 generally courts have not sustained challenges that
such statutes are unconstitutionally vague.1 8
B. Exclusion from Public Employment
Ex-offenders are excluded by statute not only from licensed occu-
pations, but also from many forms of public employment with federal
and state agencies. One study shows that federal and state laws bar or
restrict employment of ex-offenders in approximately 350 occupa-
tions, which employ ten million persons.1 9 At least six states have a
permanent bar on ex-offenders from public employment.20
C. Private Employment and Ex-offenders
Ex-offenders are blocked from employment not only by formal
statutes and ordinances, but by private employers. One study done in
five major cities showed that two-thirds of employers would not know-
ingly hire ex-offenders and at least one-third checked for criminal his-
tories to weed ex-offenders out.2 1 A strong incentive for private
employers to avoid hiring persons with a criminal record is the fast-
growing tort of negligent hiring. Courts have held employers liable to
plaintiffs who alleged that an employee of the employer injured them.
16. See Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continu-
ing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 197-98 (1995).
17. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (holding that good
moral character "can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition
will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a
vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a
dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial ....").
18. See Zemour, Inc. v. State Div. of Beverage, 347 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) ("We doubt that the legislature could in its infinite wisdom detail each salient
standard for good moral character. What constitutes good moral character is a matter to
be developed by the facts, evaluated by the agency, with a judicial review of same ever
available.").
19. BILL HEBENTON & TERRY THOMAS, CRIMINAL RECORDS: STATE, CITIZEN AND THE
POLITICS OF PROTECTION 111 (1993).
20. See Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage": No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL.
L. REv. 1027, 1036 (2002) (citingJEREMv TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, FROM PRISON To
HOME: DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 31 (2001) (listing Alabama,
Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina)).
21. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 20, at 31.
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The tort of negligent hiring requires the plaintiff to prove three
things: (1) the employer foresaw the risk; (2) the employee inflicted
harm; and (3) the employer's negligent hiring proximately caused the
plaintiffs harm. 22 The key is proof that the employer knew or should
have known that his employee might render harm to the plaintiff; the
fact that the employee has a criminal conviction can play a part in
establishing that proof. Indeed, some courts have held that the em-
ployer has a duty to apprise himself of any criminal conviction that his
employees have, and that the employer is liable if the plaintiff s injury
is foreseeable given that conviction. In Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Har-
rison,23 the employer did not apprise himself of an employee's prior
criminal record and the District Court of Appeal of Florida held him
liable to the injured plaintiff for compensatory damages of $1,900,000
and punitive damages of $600,000.24 These are amounts that could
cause the bankruptcy of a small employer.
H. Notice to Ex-offenders of Employment Disabilities
An important question is when and how ex-offenders are ap-
prised of the impediments to employment generated by their convic-
tion. Approximately 90% of criminal charges are disposed of by a plea
of guilty.25 The United States Supreme Court ruled that as part of
validating the guilty plea as voluntary and intelligent, the trial judge's
duty extends to informing the defendant of only the direct conse-
quences of the plea and not any collateral consequences, like civil dis-
abilities that may attach to a conviction. 26 Defense counsel may have
responsibilities to the defendant, like advising a defendant whether to
plead guilty, that the trial judge does not have. However, the current
law in mostjurisdictions is that the defense counsel also has no duty to
inform the defendant of collateral civil consequences that may flow
from his guilty plea. 27
22. See generally Steven C. Bednar, Employment Law Dilemmas: What To Do When the Law
Forbids Compliance, 12 BYUJ. PUB. L. 175, 178-79 (1997) (suggesting that employers inquire
of all applicants about any criminal convictions, while "carefully consider[ing] the 'job-
relatedness' of any conviction before disqualifying the applicant").
23. 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
24. Id. at 748.
25. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 n.2 (2002) (quoting DONALD J.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3
(1966)).
26. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
27. Chin & Holmes, supra note 25, at 706.
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It has been argued that this is an unanalyzed position that does
not accord with the most recent decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court on ineffective assistance of counsel, 28 particularly where
the collateral consequence for the defendant may be that he is barred
from practicing a profession that he has spent many years develop-
ing.29 However, for the bulk of the defendant population, with no spe-
cial expenditures in education and training, the length of the prison
sentence offered in a negotiated plea is likely the guiding factor in the
basic decision of whether or not to plead guilty.30 But, in any event,
one of the consequences of defense counsel having no obligation to
inform the defendant is that most defendants will only discover the
impediment once they finish their sentence and need work. Conse-
quently, they may unknowingly spend time and resources in and out
of prison to prepare for certain kinds of employment that are blocked
by virtue of their conviction.
III. The Raison d'Etre of Mass Imprisonment and
Widespread Civil Disabilities
One of the important questions to ask is how did we, as a society,
arrive at a point of relying on mass imprisonment and the concomi-
tant of barring ex-offenders from employment? In his book, Race to
Incarcerate: The Sentencing Project, Marc Mauer, of the Sentencing Pro-
ject, lays out the history of the post 1970s period of increased reliance
on punishment of persons convicted of crime, as opposed to resorting
to alternatives focused on their rehabilitation. Mr. Mauer's explana-
tion is as follows: the prison population rose 500% between 1972 and
1999, whereas the national population rose only 28%.31 Some of the
increase in imprisonment flowed from an increase in crime: crime
rose in the 1970s, declined from 1980 to 1984, rose again from 1984
to 1991, and declined from 1991 to 1995.32 Some of the increase in
28. See id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart
474 U.S. 52 (1985)).
29. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 25, who argue that the choice may not be as
limited as to whether or not the defendant pleads guilty. The defense counsel may negoti-
ate with the prosecutor for a plea to a different offense which does not have professional
disqualification as a necessary outcome. Id.
30. Even if collateral civil consequences were taken into account in determining inef-
fective assistance of counsel, Hill requires that the defendant allege that he would not have
entered a guilty plea if he were properly informed. If the defendant was primarily seeking a
lighter sentence through the negotiated plea, he would not be able to satisfy the Hill stan-
dard. Hill, 474 U.S. 52.
31. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE: THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (1999).
32. See id. at 82.
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crime resulted from the baby-boomer group reaching the ages of fif-
teen to twenty-four, an age group that has a higher rate of crime than
older age groups. 33 Additionally, some of the increase was due to in-
creased urbanization, which is associated with increased crime.3 4 How-
ever, the increased incarceration is not a strict response to the general
increase in crime because the inmate population increased even dur-
ing the two periods in which crime decreased.
Mark Mauer reports the following: prior to the 197 0s, there was
widespread reliance on minimum and maximum sentences, with judi-
cial discretion to set the actual sentence. 35 Liberal and conservative
groups criticized this posture of the law. 36 The liberals complained
that such judicial discretion could produce arbitrary differences in
sentences-thus they argued for set minimum sentences to prevent
that kind of outcome.3 7 The conservatives also pushed for set
sentences but argued for the longer, maximum sentences.3 8 Since
neither group supported the continuance ofjudicial discretion in sen-
tencing, one of their perspectives was likely to prevail. It turns out
that, over time, the conservative viewpoint won.39
Mr. Mauer raises the issue of politics: naturally the public was
concerned about the increase in crime in the post 1970s era, and this
concern was intensified by the media, which began to report more
actively on a daily basis ugly crimes of rape, murder, and robbery. 40
Politicians began to hype themselves as protectors of the public who
were "tough-on-crime." Translation: more defendants should get
longer, mandatory sentences and release on parole should be abol-
ished. This approach was a key feature of Republican Presidents Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.41 However, even Bill Clinton, in his
centrist" Democratic politics, actively sought to avoid being labeled as
"soft-on-crime." Clinton supported the death penalty and "three-
strikes-you're-out" legislation, which gave a life sentence to any indi-
33. See id. at 51.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 45.
36. See id. at 47.
37. See id. at 46-48.
38. See id. at 47-49.
39. See id. at 49.
40. Mauer notes that this concentration on crime reporting was, in part, profit-driven.
It was much less costly than other kinds of programming and news stories. See id. at 171-77.
The impact of this media approach can be seen in the instances in which a local crime
became national news-e.g., the rape of the female jogger in Central Park in New York
City.
41. See id. at 59-68.
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vidual with a third felony conviction. 4 2 Most recently, the United
States Supreme Court, generally conservative on crime issues, held
that a life sentence under "three strikes" legislation does not violate
the federal constitution, even if the last conviction was a non-violent
felony. 43
Given the two political parties' common front on a more punitive
approach to those convicted, the outcome is not surprising: in 1995
154,361 more persons received a prison sentence than in 1985. This
was an 84% increase. 4 4 This phenomenon was more intense for drug
offenses: there was a 447% increase in the risk of receiving a prison
sentence between 1980 and 1992-a by-product of imposing high,
mandatory sentencing in this area. 45 Not only has there been an in-
crease in the numbers of persons incarcerated, but also the United
States exceeds other countries in the length of prison sentences. In
the United States burglars serve an average of 16.2 months in prison,
compared to 6.8 months in England. Convicted thieves serve three to
six times as long as persons convicted of that offense in Canada.46 In
the 1980s, many states restricted the employment opportunities of re-
leased offenders even further, to reinforce the "war" on crime.4 7
IV. The Injustice of Blocking Employment of Ex-convicts
Articles addressing the problem of blocking ex-offenders from
employment quite appropriately address the injustice and dysfunc-
tional consequences of making idle a group with, perhaps, some po-
tential towards criminal activity. 48 While some early studies found
42. See id. at 68-78.
43. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
75-76 (2003). The court held that the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the
federal constitution was not violated. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19. The defendants 25 years to life
sentences were triggered by felony thefts of $400 (Ewing) and approximately $150 (An-
drade). Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63.
44. See MAUER, supra note 31, at 32.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 37.
47. SeeJOAN PETERSILIA, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHEN
PRISONERS RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 4
(2000).
48. See Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project, Collateral Consequences of a Crimi-
nal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970); Barry M. Portnoy, Employment of Former
Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 306 (1970); Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403
(1967); Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of Occupational Licensing
Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REv. 187
(1995). A rare exception is Thomas M. Hruz, The Unwisdom of the Wisconsin Fair Employment
Act's Ban of Discrimination on the Basis of Conviction Records, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 779 (2002).
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rehabilitation of criminals impossible, 49 later studies show that being
employed, particularly in jobs that pay greater than the minimum
wage, is associated with lower rates of re-offending. 50 It is also clear
that a conviction substantially lowers the chances of securing employ-
ment: one study done in California in the early 1990s showed that
only 21% of the parolee population had full-time employment.51
A. Why a Task for Civil Rights Organizations?
What few scholars have addressed, however, is why the almost uni-
versal legal scholarly argument for removing impediments to ex-of-
fender employment has had so little impact. 52 There has been some
diminution in the state laws that deprive ex-offenders of the right to
vote,5 3 but no significant decrease in laws that bar them from employ-
ment. Indeed, the number of employment and licensing require-
ments, which make a criminal conviction pertinent, have increased
substantially in recent years.5 4
A part of the problem must be that there are few groups of per-
sons in the country who are more feared and despised by the general
public than ex-convicts. Perhaps illegal immigrants, as a group, share
some of the political impotence of ex-convicts in that they, too, are
not permitted to vote and do not have visible organizations that they
join to work on their behalf. Nor do they, like ex-convicts, have finan-
cial resources they can spend to begin to develop a more favorable
public opinion with regard to their problems. However, illegal immi-
grants are not uniformly despised like ex-convicts-indeed they are
often sought after by employers for low-paying, unskilled jobs that
many American citizens do not actively seek. Nor is it possible to label
49. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22, 48-50 (Spring 1974).
50. TRAviS ET AL., supra note 20, at 31.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Most of the law review articles written on the subject urge repeal of the laws that
block employment for ex-convicts. See Walter Matthews Grant et al., Collateral Consequences
of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970); Barry M. Portnoy, Employment of Former
Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (1970); Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403
(1967); Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of Occupational Licensing
Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REv. 187
(1995). A rare exception is Thomas M. Hruz, The Unwisdom of the Wisconsin Fair Employment
Act's Ban of Discrimination on the Basis of Conviction Records, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 779 (2002).
53. Douglas R. Tims, Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Cruelly Excessive Punish-
ment, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 124, 125-27 (1975) (recounting decline in state provisions disen-
franchising ex-offenders).
54. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 156 (1999).
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such public attitudes of hostility to ex-convicts as arbitrary or crudely
discriminatory-for, after all, the ex-convicts have assaulted or in-
vaded the property of many members of that public.
It is precisely this dilemma of political impotence that calls for
help from those outside the class of ex-convicts. They are desperately
in need of the more accepted voice of those citizens who have not
been convicted of a crime. This is a task for civil rights organizations
for a number of reasons. 55
By the mid-1990s approximately half of the inmates nation-wide
were African-American, despite the fact that blacks were only 13 per-
cent of the total population. 5 6 Additionally, the overwhelming bulk of
inmates were male as opposed to female. 5 7 However, black females are
five times more likely than white females to be incarcerated. 5 The
incarceration of black females has a more devastating impact on the
black family because the black female is often the parent of last resort.
The blocking of ex-convicts from employment is thus, very much, a
"black" problem.
One might expect that ex-convicts' relatives, who themselves do
not have criminal records, might be a group advocating for reform,
particularly since some family members may benefit from support
from ex-convicts re-employment. However, some relatives will shun
contact with ex-convicts, and the imprisonment may have estranged
the ex-convict from a spouse (and children), such that the family unit
may have been forced to learn how to survive without his help. Moreo-
ver, even if the ex-convict maintains relationship with family members,
they are more likely to be (like him) poor or near poor. The poor,
even though eligible to register and vote, do so in lower proportions
than middle or upper class persons-thus diminishing their impact
55. This article is limited to civil rights organizations that primarily concentrate on
African-American problems. Civil disabilities that block employment also have a dispropor-
tionate impact on Hispanics, and a conviction can have the impact of deportation for im-
migrants. However, this writer is not as acquainted with all of the additional problems that
other minorities must face, so the comment is limited. There is, however, most assuredly a
basis for coalition amongst minority organizations to seek reform.
56. MAUER, supra note 31, at 124.
57. In relation to their number in the population, men are 15 times more likely than
women to be incarcerated. On June 30, 2002, 60 females per 100,000 were serving a sen-
tence of more than one year compared to a male ratio of 902 per 100,000. HARRISON &
KARBERG, supra note 1, at 5.
58. The rate was 349 per 100,000 for black females and 68 per 100,000 for white
females in 2002. Id. at 11.
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on the politics of reform. 59 The poor also do not now have visible
national organizations-like the National Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion-which began in the 1960s but is no longer functioning.60
Civil rights organizations are the prime candidates to take on the
difficult task of changing the laws blocking ex-convicts from employ-
ment. Why? It is because civil rights organizations successfully invali-
dated a host of laws that formally segregated the black population. 61
The organizations also successfully changed the attitudes of millions
of white Americans towards racial acceptance, despite the fact that ra-
cially discriminatory attitudes existed for over 200 years of slavery and
during the legally enforced apartheid that followed slavery. The result
was a host of laws that forbade racial discrimination in employment,
housing, voting, and public accommodations. 62
These accomplishments were not easy-indeed the push for ra-
cial reform was often met with murderous violence and politicians
who actively resisted change under the "state's rights" banner.63 How-
ever, with mobilization of the black masses, eloquent and persuasive
appeals to the white public, and non-violent demonstrations, the ad-
vances were secured.
Some of that same energy and creativity should now be applied to
the problems of ex-convicts. This is particularly appropriate since civil
rights organizations today face an identity crisis. The very success of
structuring an attack on formal and open racial discrimination raises
the question: what should such organizations concentrate on now?
At one time in our slavery history (and occasionally in a more
sophisticated way, in recent history), whites viewed blacks as geneti-
59. Mary H. Cooper, Low Voter Turnout: Is America's Democracy In Trouble?, 10 CQ RE-
SEARCHER 833, 839 (2000).
60. The organization was created by George Wiley in 1966, and at its peak had a
membership of 22,000 families nationwide. It ceased functioning in 1975. See Mark Toney,
Revisiting the National Welfare Rights Organization, COLOR LINES: RACE CULTURE ACTION, Fall
2000, at 27.
61. See, e.g., Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (desegregating the
Oklahoma law school); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating restrictive cove-
nants); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (desegregating public schools).
62. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2002); Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3601; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-2.
63. In 1963, the then Governor George Wallace tried to block the enrollment of two
black students in the University of Alabama under a "state's right" claim. SeeJACK GREEN-
BERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 338, 338-40 (1994).
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cally inferior.64 Such notions of blacks' biologically derived "laziness"
were sustained in the face of black slaves working six and seven days a
week. These notions, however, begin to lose respectability in the face
of research denying the claim that there is any such thing as pure
"race" groups and rebutting the charges of heredity (as opposed to
environment) explaining differences between groups. 65 Civil rights
groups successfully countered such notions in the white community
through appeals to access to basic citizenship rights.
Today, however, there is a lingering public view that blacks are, as
a group, highly prone towards criminal activity. One may be able to
label this view as incorrect or as a broad "stereotype" to the extent that
it is taken to describe every single black person in all situations. How-
ever, it is a view that many whites will continue to sustain because if
one wants to lump all blacks together and treat them as a separate
"group," there is some empirical basis for the claim.6 6 Our newspapers
and magazines (and more indirectly many of our movie and TV
shows) contain such portrayals-and thus, the white public's view is
sustained and they will act on it. It may explain, in part, some of the
white flight to the suburbs from inner cities as formal racial segrega-
tion broke down and thus augured the possibility of more racial inter-
action. It may contribute to much of the racial profiling by white
police officers.
It is not, however, a phenomenon that only blacks have exper-
ienced. At one time in our history, Jewish and Italian immigrants were
tainted with the brush of being "criminals" because they had very high
crime rates in the areas in which they lived upon their entry into the
country. 67 Those crime rates diminished (as did the concomitant neg-
ative reputations) as the groups became more middle class. But that
history may explain some of the uneasiness that some Italians have
today with the HBO program "The Sopranos," which depicts Italian
Mafia figures. Therefore, civil rights organizations today have a stake
64. For a connotation of the notion in more recent history, see RICHARD J. HERRN-
STEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE (1994).
65. See BERNIE DEVLIN ET AL., INTELLIGENCE, GENES, AND SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS RESPOND
TO THE BELL CURVE (1997); STEPHEN FRASER, THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (1995); ASHLEY MONTAGU, RACE AND IQ (2003).
66. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 13 (1997) ("a notably large pro-
portion of the crimes that people fear most-aggravated assault, robbery, rape, murder-
are committed by persons who happen to be black.").
67. See Wop! A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ANTI-ITALIAN DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED
STATES (Salvatore J. LaGumina ed., 1973); HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN
AMERICA 170 (1992).
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in terms of blacks' reputation, as a group, to fight for programs and
changes in the law that would contribute to the diminishment of
crime in the black community.
Moreover, changing the group's reputation may have some prac-
tical, positive effects. Blacks have generally had an unemployment rate
that is double that of their white counterparts. 68 There are a number
of factors, not involving race discrimination, that contribute to that
gap (lower levels of education, for example), but it is possible that
some private employers avoid hiring blacks (even those who do not
have a criminal conviction) by relying on the group's statistical pro-
pensity toward criminal activity. Reducing the extent to which ex-con-
victs contribute to that statistical propensity may, therefore, have a
protective impact on blacks as a whole in their seeking of
employment.
B. Programs for Change
The civil rights organizations should focus on legislative changes
or litigation to improve employment prospects of ex-convicts.
1. Repeal of Licensing Statutes
Civil rights organizations should begin to seek repeal of the stat-
utes that bar employment of persons solely on the basis of a convic-
tion, when the nature of the conviction has no relationship to the
capacity to perform the tasks of that occupation. Most of such legisla-
tion is in the states, and civil rights organizations may be aided in their
reform efforts by adverse conditions that exist in many states at this
time. Many states are experiencing serious budgetary problems-their
expenditures far exceed the level of income through taxes. States in
every region in the country will institute, for the academic year
2003-2004, the steepest increases in public college and university tu-
itions in the last ten years.69 Such increases might, speculatively, be
affected by accelerating costs of the increased inmate population.
Moreover, since sentences are longer, the inmate population will
be increasingly older, bringing increased costs for health and hospice
care. States could reduce some of this cost by releasing more inmates,
but the state would then have a stake in removing barriers to their
employment or the ex-convicts would simply be re-incarcerated for
68. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNE-
QUAL 102-03 (1992).
69. See Dale Russakoff & Amy Argetsinger, States Plan Big Tuition Increases, WASH. POST,
July 22, 2003, at Al.
Winter 2004] EMPLOYMENT OF EX-CONVICTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
crimes committed just for support purposes. One study shows that
within three years, 46% of released felons were re-convicted. 70 Civil
rights organizations could also enlist the support of the Congressional
Black Caucus (a group of black politicians holding seats in the House
of Representatives), as there is also a need to repeal federal legislation
that blocks ex-convicts from employment.
2. The Impact of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of race. 71 The statute does not expressly
restrict the ability of employers to consider criminal conviction
records within employment related decisions. However, a theory
under the statute postulates that it is unlawful for an employer to use
criteria for exclusion from employment when it has a disparate impact
on minorities protected under the statute and bears no relationship to
performance of the job.72 Consequently, it has been held by some
courts that reliance on a criminal record to refuse employment vio-
lates Title VII where the criteria have an adverse impact on blacks and
are not shown to be job-related. 73 Civil rights litigating outfits should
use this statute more actively to protect black job applicants.
It may be difficult to rely on Title VII for litigation in the private
sector because many private employers may rely on a criminal convic-
tion to refuse employment, but the applicant may never learn that
that was the basis upon which he or she was refused employment. Civil
rights litigating units, however, should begin to attack the state stat-
utes that expressly deny persons with criminal convictions from hold-
ing certain state jobs. The argument could be made that where the
exclusion has an adverse impact on blacks and is notjob-related, then
the state statute is pre-empted because of the collision with the federal
statute.
70. Dermot Sullivan, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring, and Criminal Record Checks: New
York's Need to Reevaluate Its Priorities to Promote Public Safety, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 581, 585
(1998) (citing BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RECnm-
MVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1997)).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2002).
72. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). The Court invalidated the
company's practice of barring persons from hire who did not have a high school degree
because this requirement eliminated a disproportionate number of black applicants with-
out a job-related justification. A number of whites who did not have a high school degree
occupied the jobs to which the new rule had been applied.
73. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975).
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One means by which civil rights organizations could increase
public support is by making clear that while there is a concern for the
disproportionate impact of exclusion from work on black ex-convicts,
the goal is to protect all ex-convicts, including whites, from arbitrary
exclusion from employment. This could be realized by a civil rights
litigating outfit bringing a suit on behalf of a white ex-convict who is
excluded from employment because of his conviction, alleging a viola-
tion of Title VII. Such a suit would likely be met with the challenge
that the white plaintiff could not satisfy the Griggs criteria that utilizing
a conviction as a disqualification had an adverse impact on whites as a
group.
A Griggs challenge could be met with the following arguments. If
the particular conviction was one in which it could be demonstrated
that utilizing it would have an adverse impact on blacks, and was not
job-related, then the employer would be asserting that he is entitled to
use a criteria to exclude whites that could not be relied upon to ex-
clude blacks. However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that Title VII bars discrimination on the grounds of "race" and there-
fore whites, in addition to blacks, are protected against racial
discrimination.
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,7 4 one black and
two white employees were charged with theft from their employer. 75
The white employees were fired and the black man remained em-
ployed. 76 The Court held that the white employees had a prima facie
case of discriminatory treatment under Title VII because they were
fired, and the black employee was not, despite the fact that all three
had allegedly committed the same offense. 77
It could be countered that McDonald is not on point, for in that
case there was conclusive proof that a black had benefited from pref-
erential treatment and in the case of the white suing to prevent use of
his conviction as a disqualifier, that he could not show such specific
previous preferential treatment for blacks. However, McDonald could
be read broadly for the principle that Title VII does not permit differ-
ential refusal of employment of any racial group on grounds unre-
lated to the performance of the job.
There is, however, another ground that may be argued to support
a suit on behalf of a white male ex-convict. As noted earlier in this
74. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
75. See id. at 275-76.
76. See id. at 282-83.
77. See id. at 285.
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article, males vastly exceed females in criminal convictions for most
crimes. Title VII also bars discrimination on the basis of "sex" and
courts have interpreted this as barring discrimination against males,
under the same standards as would be applicable to females.78 In
Dothard v. Rawlinson,79 the court held that it was discriminatory to util-
ize a height requirement for access to employment, because it had a
disparate impact on females, and could not be proven to be related to
adequate performance of the job.80 Likewise it could be argued that it
is discriminatory to disqualify from employment on the basis of a pre-
vious criminal conviction, where that has a disparate impact on males
and is not job-related.
3. Affirmative Protection
Civil rights organizations should also lobby for passage of legisla-
tion, such as that which exists in New York,81 prohibiting denial of
employment to persons solely because of a prior conviction. There are
two circumstances under the New York statute in which an employer
may reject an ex-offender applicant. Under the first circumstance, an
employer may reject an ex-offender where there is a direct relation-
ship between the employment or license sought and the prior crimi-
nal offense. This is defined as a circumstance where the "nature of
criminal conduct for which the person was convicted has a direct bear-
ing on his fitness or ability to perform one or more of the duties or
responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment
sought."82
Eight factors are listed in the statute to assist the employer in
making the judgment about the existence of such a direct relation-
ship: (1) the public policy encourages the employment of persons
with previous convictions; (2) the specific duties of the job; (3) the
impact the previous conviction may have on the applicant's fitness to
perform those duties; (4) how much time has elapsed between the
conviction and the application for employment (an old conviction
should be given less weight); (5) the applicant's age (if a minor, pre-
sumably the conviction should be given less weight); (6) the serious-
ness of the offense; (7) any evidence of rehabilitation or good
78. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
79. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
80. See id. at 331.
81. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750-753 (McKinney 2003).
82. Id. at § 750(3).
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conduct post the conviction; (8) the safety and welfare of individuals
or the general public.
8 3
The second circumstance, in which an employer may reject an ex-
offender under the New York statute, is where his employment might
create an "unreasonable risk" to persons or property.8 4 This term is
not defined, but some courts have held that it is to be determined on
a case-by-case basis, taking into account the eight factors involved in
determining a direct relationship.8 5
The value of the New York statute is that it rejects per se disquali-
fications of ex-convicts solely on the basis of a conviction in the ab-
stract. It requires a contextual evaluation of the impact of a conviction
on the applicant's capacity to perform a specific job efficiently, and
without undue risk to others encountered in the normal course of
work.
4. Restriction of the Tort of Negligent Hiring
Civil rights organizations should, however, seek a supplement to
the New York law. At present, as noted earlier in this article, the tort of
negligent hiring can dissuade some employers from employing ex-
convicts if they fear that the courts will hold them liable for any injury
occasioned by such an employee when an assertion is made that the
employer should have been able to predict the injury based on the
employee's prior conviction. Civil rights organizations should lobby
for a restriction of the tort of negligent hiring in this form as a means
of reinforcing the public policy of hiring ex-convicts.
If one restricted the tort of negligent hiring, how would the pub-
lic and customers of an employer be protected? The supplement to
the New York law should require employers to inquire of all employ-
ment applicants whether they have ever been convicted of a crime.
The employer should advise the applicant that under the (New York)
law a conviction does not operate as a per se disqualification for em-
ployment. However, the employer should warn the applicant that if an
applicant deliberately lies and refuses to disclose a prior police record,
he can be discharged for the falsification.8 6 If the applicant does not
83. Id. at § 753(1).
84. Id. at § 752(2).
85. See Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 523 N.E.2d 806, 807 (N.Y. 1988).
86. SeeJimerson v. Kisco Co., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1976). The court held that the
black plaintiff could not have been refused employment because of a police record (an
arrest) because that would have had an adverse impact on black applicants as a group. Id.
at 1010. The court also found, however, that the plaintiff was fired for lying about his
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disclose a prior conviction the employer would have absolute immu-
nity to the tort of negligent hiring based on the lack of knowledge. 87 If
the applicant does disclose a prior conviction, the employer can make
a judgment as to whether the applicant's conviction clearly does not
jeopardize factor eight above the "safety and welfare of individuals or
the general public" or create an "unreasonable risk" to persons or
property. If there is absolute clarity that the conviction could never
bottom a suit for negligent hiring, then the employer need do noth-
ing further-he can hire the ex-convict. (Indeed if the employer ref-
uses to hire under these circumstances, where the applicant is
otherwise qualified, he would run the risk of violating the basic New
York law.)
In the event that there is any ambiguity at all about potential risk,
an administrative board should be established and the employer
would be required to submit the case to that board for a final judg-
ment. It is assumed that the employer would only submit ex-convict
applicants who met all other criteria for holding the job-the only
thing at stake is the impact of the prior conviction. If the administra-
tive board found that the ex-convict's conviction did not create an
"unreasonable risk" of injury to the public or fellow employees, then
the employer would have absolute immunity against a tort of negli-
gent injury based on that conviction. Employers would be strongly
urged, as a matter of protecting themselves prospectively against any
negligent hiring tort, to submit generally all known convictions for
clearance by the board. Only employers who had knowledge of a con-
viction and who had not taken advantage of the clearance option by
the board would be subject to a tortuous action. Naturally, the state
would have to be very aggressive in informing employers (especially
small employers) about this process of protection. Civil rights organi-
zations should have the employer community backing their lobbying
for this supplement to the law.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to identify a problem that dispropor-
tionately diminishes employment for blacks, since they loom large in
the population of ex-convicts. It attempts also to suggest strategies for
civil rights organizations to cope with that problem. Civil rights orga-
police record, and that there was no evidence that blacks falsified applications dispropor-
tionately in comparison to whites. Id.
87. The inquiry should be limited to the applicant, to relieve small employers of the
cost of a formal record search.
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nizations concerned about blacks should now increasingly focus on
those blacks at the lower end of the class level. Middle class blacks, in
many instances, have professional organizations (e.g., the National
Medical Association, the National Bar Association) that attend to the
special needs of their membership and thus they will require less in-
tervention by civil rights organizations. 88 Civil rights organizations
have already secured a formal prohibition against any overt or covert
racial discrimination against such middle class persons. Black ex-con-
victs are likely to have, as a group, little education and thus they must
compete for only low-skilled employment. It is especially important to
have this group employed because they victimize other blacks, dispro-
portionately, if they return to crime. The measures proposed in this
article, if adopted or litigated successfully, would benefit the black
community and society at large.
88. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 11 (1997).
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